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This paper provides a mid-term assessment of externally-led Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) during the United Nations (UN) led peacebuilding intervention in Timor-
Leste. Despite initial difficulties, several core institutions, introduced by the UN, 
remain effective and were integrated into local practices. These initial security 
problems of the new-born Timor-Leste state, included the radical reconfiguration 
of the power balances within elites and an unfamiliarity with new approaches to 
security governance by the indigenous actors themselves. The lack of contextual 
knowledge and insensitivity to local political dynamics by external actors exacerbated 
these issues. Nonetheless, Timor-Leste has found ways to achieve some measure of 
political stability and physical security, both of which were always overarching goals 
of SSR.
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Prologue
I returned to Dili in April-May 2019, where I had worked for a conflict prevention 
project from 2010 until 2013, led by the National Directorate for Prevention of 
Community Conflict (NDPCC), which falls under the auspices of the Secretary 
of State for Security in Timor-Leste. This project engaged in community-level 
conflict prevention, and our work centered upon the village of Comoro, located 
on the outskirts of Dili, which was a well-known epicenter of communal violence. 
I had returned to Timor-Leste because it had been almost 20 years since the 
“popular consultation” or referendum had been conducted in August 1999, which 
set the course of the state-building journey for an independent Timor-Leste. I 
thought two decades would serve as a good temporal milestone to review mid-
term trajectories and the achievements of key post-independence peacebuilding 
endeavors. This time, with the support of Flavio Simoes, a former advisor to 
© 2021 The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University
ISSN 2288-2693 Print, ISSN 2288-2707 Online
Asian Journal of Peacebuilding  Vol. 9  No. 1 (2021): 111-138
doi: 10.18588/202105.00a172 Special Issue – Research Article
112 Yuji Uesugi
the Secretary of State for Security, I conducted field research in Dili and several 
municipalities (areas previously called districts).
I was interested in observing the security situation as it operated at the 
community level throughout the country and also in widening my understanding 
of how each community maintained its security, law and order and justice; key 
factors which I felt would reveal the fruits of the United Nations (UN) efforts 
for Security Sector Reform (SSR)—defined as “the enhancement of effective 
and accountable security for the State and its peoples” (UN 2008, para 17). A 
nationwide survey conducted in 2015 by the Asia Foundation (2016) indicated 
that, astonishingly, 100 percent of community leaders and, more surprisingly, 
99 percent of the general public in Timor-Leste, indicated trust in the police. 
Based on my previous experience working with the NDPCC, one of the most 
serious challenges for SSR in Timor-Leste centered on nurturing public trust in 
the police, since they had been closely associated with the oppressive shadow of 
the Indonesian National Police (Belo 2014). Even after independence, abuse of 
power by the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) was rampant and the risk of 
police power being misused by the political elite was also high in the early stages 
of state-building. With its links to various fraternal groups, including groups of 
hooligans and organized crime gangs, the police were largely considered to be as 
much a part of the problem rather than forming part of the solution. 
Such problematic behavior by the police were the root of skeptical views 
towards the police as an organization among the general population and such 
behaviors damaged its legitimacy and credibility. These were further confirmed 
by my observations during a number of field visits that I conducted between 
2001 and 2015 in various locations in the Dili, Cova-Lima, Ermera, Baucau, 
Liquca and Bobonaro districts. It was difficult, therefore, to believe that the police 
had been able to win the trust of both community leaders as well as the general 
public in the space of only a few years after the withdrawal of the United Nations 
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) that was undertaken in December 
of 2012. According to Pauline Tweedie (Personal Interview with Pauline Tweedie, 
the country director of the Asia Foundation office in Dili, Timor-Leste, on April 
30, 2019), such a miracle was due to the combined efforts of the police and the 
respective communities in pursuit of community policing, making use of a new 
initiative called the Community Policing Council (CPC), which was launched in 
2015 as a vehicle to enhance the community-police relationship.
Introduction
As part of this special issue, this article has two main goals: firstly, it seeks to 
showcase SSR trajectories and records the achievements of both the UN and 
Timorese society. It does so by simultaneously revealing the presence of what 
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is actually a hybrid dynamic through which the Timorese society has adopted, 
adjusted or rejected the externally-led SSR. Timor-Leste, where the peacebuilding 
process was initiated over 20 years ago as a massive external intervention led by 
the UN, can offer an insightful perspective on the importance of approaching 
the multiple levels at play within a given society, ranging from the national/top 
state level to the grassroots/bottom of the societal level, the analysis of which 
is essential for understanding the comprehensive and long-term effects of SSR. 
This article attempts to assess the med-term impact of SSR as implemented in 
Timor-Leste. In so doing, it employs a triad form of hybridity—(1) exogenous/
endogenous; (2) formal/informal; and (3) national/community—as an analytical 
lens. We argue that the triad hybrid interactions, in conjunction with the 
emergence of a more conducive environment within Timorese society, directed 
the tide of the SSR process, which, in turn, facilitated the rise of the Timorese 
version of security governance (for an extensive review of the political and 
economic development in Timorese society over the past 20 years, see the article 
written by Wallis and Neves in this special issue). 
The following account is based on more than a decade of accumulated parti-
cipant observation in the field (2001-15) and more recent field work conducted 
in April-May 2019. The findings of this article will hopefully contribute to the 
overall effort to evaluate peacebuilding in Timor-Leste within the Quality Peace 
framework (Wallensteen 2015), which explores positive conditions that prevent 
the recurrence of violence and move post-conflict societies beyond the mere 
absence of war. To assess the quality of peace emanating at the national and com-
munity levels in Timor-Leste in the last two decades, it applies the mainstream 
SSR framework, combined with a relatively new approach to SSR referred to as 
Community Security (CS). In this evaluative endeavor, this article analyzes and 
evaluates the dynamic processes of SSR through which local agencies, with or 
without external actors/resources, crafted, selected, and/or modified, voluntarily 
or otherwise, the ways and means to achieve the goals of SSR. 
Among so many different tasks required for peacebuilding, why does this 
article focus on SSR? SSR is a process which aims to increase abilities to meet 
the range of security needs within societies in a manner consistent with demo-
cratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency, and the rule of 
law (OECD 2007). It seeks to establish control of violence in a society, usually 
through reconstructing or reforming statutory forces such as the military and 
police. Political stability and physical safety constitute the two main pillars of 
peace in any given society and it is usually through SSR that these pillars are 
consolidated. Because of this critical function, SSR can provide an important 
measure for evaluating the quality of peace. Many existing studies on SSR, 
including those of mine (Uesugi 2014a; Howe and Uesugi 2016; Howe, Peou, and 
Uesugi 2021), analyzed the performance of the UN as a lead implementor, while 
local stakeholders were treated merely as subjects who either accepted or resisted 
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these external initiatives. Although local ownership has been claimed as a key 
approach to SSR (DCAF 2012; Donais 2008; Mobekk 2010; Gordon 2014), this 
perspective still focuses on policy and the performance of external intervenors, 
and a tension between the exogenous and endogenous approaches has been 
highlighted (Uesugi 2014b) and local resistance depicted (Mac Ginty 2008; 2011; 
Hellmüller and Santschi 2014).
An interactive process between the external and local SSR agencies, through 
which externally-introduced SSR is shaped and fine-tuned with the local realities, 
must be clarified as local factors influence political stability and physical safety. 
The neglected roles of local agency and domestic power constellations have 
been identified as new perspectives on SSR (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014). 
From this point of view, local ownership for externally-led SSR is more likely 
to emerge when the “dominant coalition” of the local elites perceive that the 
reform initiatives can advance their political status vis-à-vis their opponents 
and enhance or preserve their privileges and vested interests (North et al. 2009; 
Albrecht 2015). Building on this new direction in research, this article attempts to 
capture such dynamism with the concept of hybridity (Mac Ginty and Richmond 
2016; Schroeder et al. 2014). It explores how external intervention impacts the 
subsequent local activities for SSR and the quality of peace. Many third-party 
evaluations of SSR, as well as internal ones, have focused on its short-term effects 
at the national level or their assessment has focused mainly on the progress of 
the security sector in the capital. The impact of SSR on the political stability 
and physical safety in rural areas has not been extensively examined. Regarding 
political stability and physical safety, SSR evaluation should encompass not only 
the assessment of the top-down policy and its implementation, but also those 
policies emanating from the bottom-up, gauging their impact, respectively and in 
conjunction, on the local communities.
The process of SSR is not only long and extensive, but also it requires careful 
analysis of the causes of the conflict itself, and the nature of the governance and 
public institutions that need to be established to avoid the recurrence of violence. 
Methodologically, it is very difficult to argue for direct causal effects/relationships 
between what the UN has done in the past and what we see on the ground 
now (Hunt 2016). Therefore, the following is an attempt to compare what was 
initiated by outsiders and their plausible “contribution,” not “attribution” (d’Estrée 
2020), to the existing consequences in a wide spectrum of interrelated outcomes 
associated with SSR such as institution and capacity building, reconciliation, 
transitional justice and community policing. Before moving on to an empirical 
discussion, an outline of the theoretical framework of this study is in order.
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Theoretical Framework on SSR
Mainstream SSR
SSR is essentially a process of reconstructing, reconstituting, or developing the 
security and justice sectors of a society. It is recognized as a priority in post-
conflict peacebuilding and belongs to an emerging field of security governance. In 
this approach, non-traditional security agendas are taken into consideration in 
addition to traditional state-centric issues, and activities of non-state agencies, not 
limited to those of the state, are also included in efforts, structures, processes, and 
institutions to maintain security, law and order, and justice (Hänggi 2005). More 
specifically, in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding, security governance 
refers to relevant security arrangements at the national and sub-national levels 
encompassing non-state security actors (ibid.).
This view has been reflected in the dominant theory/model of SSR, emphasi-
zing the holistic scope of the reform objects. SSR covers not only statutory security 
and justice actors (e.g. the military, police, intelligence agencies, and judicial 
and penal institutions) but also non-statutory actors (e.g. militias, vigilante 
groups and customary courts), as well as oversight and management by actors/
institutions, both statutory (e.g. the parliament, ministries and ombudsperson) 
and non-statutory (e.g. civil society organizations, media and academia) (Uesugi 
2014a). While it is often the case that statutory institutions are identified as the 
main object of SSR, non-statutory actors such as rebel groups, tribal chiefs, 
customary courts and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly 
recognized as key SSR stakeholders (Lawrence 2012; Donais 2017). Following 
in the footsteps of this more holistic approach, this article will shed light on not 
only statutory but also non-statutory actors, and discuss how these two entities 
interact with each other.
SSR is understood as existing within the nexus of development and security, 
which is itself based on the assumption that development and security are 
intrinsically linked and thus both approaches need to be coordinated with 
each other. This key feature of SSR—interconnectivity between security and 
development—can be found in the two objectives of SSR: effectiveness and 
accountability. It is this dual commitment to making security and justice sectors 
effective and accountable that distinguishes SSR from other types of security 
assistance such as “train-and-equip” (Sedra 2010; Mason 2016). The underlying 
assumption is that if domestically powerful security actors capable of over-
throwing the government or overwhelming counterforces in society are not 
placed under proper supervision (democratic control and civilian oversight), they 
can themselves easily turn into security threats. Therefore, holding security actors 
accountable for their actions through establishing democratic governance of the 
security sector is of paramount importance in the mainstream approach to SSR 
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(Ball 2010). 
Another important feature of SSR is its inherent political nature (Downes 
2014). Since the development community is accustomed to providing technical 
assistance after an overall political settlement is reached between the conflict 
parties, there is a hidden risk that the political nature of SSR is overlooked. 
While there is often broad commitment to the need to reform the security and 
justice sectors, conflict parties tend to disagree on how such reforms should 
be implemented (DCAF 2019; Mason 2016), as they—both incumbent and 
insurgent—are often still operating under the logic of the “politics of survival” or 
continuation of hostilities in politics, which deprives the losers of their chance 
for a comeback (Peou 2018). For them, it is critical that their sources of survival, 
i.e., the armed forces, are kept intact, especially in the aftermath of civil war. 
Externally-led SSR can be deemed political interference because it may affect 
the power balance existing among the conflicting parties, which makes a narrow 
technical approach insufficient (Jackson and Bakrania 2018). Building on this 
premise, this article takes into consideration the politics of SSR and investigates 
how local political actors exercised their influence on the SSR process and later 
outcomes.
Community Security
In addition to the above-mentioned framework of the mainstream SSR, CS—also 
known as the second generation SSR (Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018; Dewhurst and 
Greising 2017)—is incorporated into the following analysis as an added value 
of this article. If SSR is understood as being an effort to address relevant issues 
and policies at the national level employing top-down approaches, CS can be 
categorized as being the idiosyncratic security arrangements effective in certain 
communities at the sub-national level, usually relying on bottom-up approaches. 
While SSR can also accommodate the sub-national level activities and CS does 
not limit itself to bottom-up approaches, constructive engagement of the two 
endeavors and interaction between the national and sub-national levels are 
essential for establishing effective systems of security governance in post-conflict 
society.
The concept of CS as a genuinely practical concern has been recognized 
and promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and a 
British based NGO, known as Saferworld. According to the UNDP (n.d.), CS is 
a part of SSR, and thus both pursue the same objective of addressing the causes 
of insecurity in order to improve the physical safety of the people concerned. 
They employ similar measures such as building the capacity of the police, 
strengthening accountable institutions and advocating human rights. A major 
difference between SSR and CS can be found in their emphasis and methodology. 
While SSR can be classified as primarily strategic and institutional endeavors, 
seeking to address essentially national security priorities, CS can be defined as 
 Evaluating Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste 117
efforts focusing on tactical operations initiated at the grassroot or community 
level. SSR is often seen as a form of support from external agencies such as 
the UN and other donors, albeit with local ownership being seen as a key to 
successful SSR (Donais 2008). CS is understood to be a community-driven 
process of maintaining and improving law and order in a concerned community, 
including the establishment of effective community-police relations to enhance 
the security, trust, and protection of population, especially women (ibid.). Such 
activities, aimed at strengthening police capacities to adopt community-oriented 
and gender-responsive policing, are often classified as community policing, as in 
the case of Timor-Leste (Kocak 2018). 
A perspective of CS can offer an additional function to SSR. According to 
Saferworld (Bennett 2014), CS is recognized as a bridge between the formal 
and informal systems, as well as between the national and sub-national levels. 
While the conventional approaches to SSR have primarily focused on the formal 
system of security provision, CS emphasizes the significance of shedding light 
on informal actors, arrangements and effects. In regard to this point, Saferworld 
defines CS as a people-centered approach that builds the capacity and willingness 
of communities, local authorities and security providers to address their own 
sources of insecurity (ibid.). CS provides a methodology that allows each 
community to define and implement reforms tailored to suit its exact needs 
and priorities, so that each community can find creative, collaborative and 
preventative solutions to security challenges (ibid.).
Due to this emphasis on local contexts and dynamics, CS often engages with 
bottom-up approaches; at the same time, however, because CS is also understood 
as being an important bridge that links reform efforts undertaken at the sub-
national and national levels, a critical function of CS is to serve as a vehicle for 
harnessing capacities at different levels and addressing obstacles at all levels (ibid.).
A key perspective of the second generation SSR outlined in the above 
discussion as features of CS, will serve as a part of the theoretical framework 
used to assess the SSR process in Timor-Leste. By applying a triad hybridity lens, 
this article seeks to examine the interplay between exogenous and endogenous 
approaches, between formal and informal mechanisms, and between national 
and community (sub-national) initiatives. Before undertaking the main task, in 
the next section, a background to SSR in Timor-Leste will be presented. 
Background to SSR in Timor-Leste
Major Security Challenges
To help facilitate our understanding of the circumstances in which a series of 
externally-led SSR projects were implemented, the security landscape of Timor-
Leste will be outlined, with a focus on three key challenges within Timorese 
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society. The first challenge involved the relationship between the governments of 
Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The contested territory had been occupied forcefully 
by Indonesia since 1975, and the Timorese resistance movement was organized to 
fight against Indonesian rule, a situation which continued until Indonesia decided 
to withdraw from the territory after the referendum of 1999. Many atrocities 
were committed by the Indonesian security forces to suppress the resistance 
movement. A major point of contention has been the treatment of those who 
were strategically responsible for the massive human rights violations committed 
during the Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999. 
The second challenge existed within Timorese society. This was a cognitive 
cleavage which emerged after independence between those who had devoted 
their lives to the liberation/resistance movement, sacrificing potentially their very 
lives (not to mention their future educational and employment opportunities), 
and those who were not active members of the resistance movement and who 
thus enjoyed a few educational and employment benefits during the Indonesian 
era. The former, known as the pro-independence residents, faced off against 
latter or the pro-integration residents who had collaborated with the Indonesian 
authorities, including illegal militias and public servants such as police officers. 
This division created major tensions in the 1999 referendum, and atrocities were 
committed by pro-integration militias against pro-independence residents in the 
aftermath of the referendum.
During the 1999 post-referendum violence, pro-integration factions fled to 
Indonesian West Timor, while some pro-independence residents were expelled 
forcefully from their homes. They became “refugees” in West Timor. Immediately 
after the 1999 violence, cross-border penetration by former pro-integration 
militias was perceived as a source of community insecurity in Timor-Leste, 
particularly in its western border area and Oecussi exclave. The presence of 
UN peacekeepers helped ease anxiety among the population who remained 
wary the illusionary shadows of former militias who remained in West Timor. 
Additionally, the confrontation between the pro-independence residents and 
repatriated ex-militias was considered to be a potential source of instability.
The third challenge, which was closely related to the second, arose in 2006 
when those who had devoted their lives to the independence struggle felt that 
their dedication had not been sufficiently acknowledged nor rewarded, with 
their lives continuing to be difficult even after they had achieved independence. 
After the independence in 2002, the issue was framed as how to provide honors 
(recognition) and rewards (compensation) for the devotion of the veterans. 
Veterans were former members of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation 
of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL) and other clandestine groups who were meritorious 
contributors to the liberation/resistance struggle. According to the dominant 
narrative that exacerbated this internal tension, the bases of the FALINTIL 
were centered around the eastern part of the territory whereas people in the 
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western part of the territory were perceived to have largely collaborated with 
the Indonesian authorities during the resistance period. In this narrative, the 
pro-integration residents were categorized as the “Westerners” whereas the pro-
independence residents were identified as the “Easterners.” This social cleavage 
between “Easterners” and “Westerners” served as a fertilizing ground for the 
2006 uprising of the “petitioners” who claimed that due to their background 
of being “Westerners” and not having served in the FALINTIL, they had been 
discriminated against in the Defense Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL). This 
division within the military surfaced in 2006 and evolved into a major politico-
security crisis that lasted for two years.
Several senior political leaders were involved in this crisis and exploited their 
clientelism with both the statutory and non-statutory forces, which resulted in 
the killing of 38 people, including the shooting of eight unarmed police officers 
by mobilized troops, and the displacement of 150,000 people from their homes 
(UN 2006; Sugito et al. 2020). Although the real physical violence was confined 
geographically to Dili, close to 15 percent of the population was displaced not 
only in Dili but also in other districts, which could have been a potential source of 
instability (UN 2006). Such a high number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
indicated the collective trauma among ordinary Timorese, which stemmed from 
a shared feeling of anxiety over unreconciled injustices and unfairness; between 
those who had devoted their lives to the resistance movement and who had been 
inadequately acknowledged. This setback is often registered as a failure of the 
early SSR initiatives led by the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET).
In the conventional literature on SSR, the first (strategic) and the second 
(societal) challenges have usually been placed outside the scope of SSR. It is the 
third challenge, which stemmed from defects of the security sector, that has been 
conceived as the main target of SSR. However, responses to the three layers of 
challenges will be examined in the following section, due to the way in which 
they have been closely intertwined with one another in the case of Timor-Leste as 
underlying contextual factors that have either constrained or facilitated the SSR 
process.
Transitional Justice
To address the first two challenges, the UNTAET set up the Serious Crime Unit 
under its auspices to investigate and file criminal cases such as murder and rape 
committed in 1999. Alongside the Serious Crime Unit, two temporal judicial/
reconciliation measures—the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) and the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)—were established 
(these measures are reviewed extensively in the article by Cross in this special 
issue). The less serious cases were handed over to the CAVR, which covered not 
only the atrocities committed in 1999 but also included other criminal cases 
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committed under Indonesian rule between 1975 and 1999, to seek alternative 
dispute resolution outside the penal code (Kent 2012).
Regarding the first challenge, the relationship between former adversaries, 
Indonesia and Timor-Leste, was treated as a strategic security concern for 
the newly-born state. Despite the UN attempts to push for retributive justice, 
bringing alleged perpetrators of human rights violation to justice, as seen in the 
establishment of the SPSC, the Timorese leaders decided to explore the avenue 
of restorative justice, emphasizing reconciliation with their former enemies. 
Although 391 individuals were indicted by the SPSC, three quarters of them 
remained in Indonesia and the government of Indonesia refused to extradite 
those indicted (UN 2005; Järvinen 2004). Hence, those who were brought to 
justice were mostly Timorese who had joined militia groups operated under 
the auspices of the Indonesian security force, and those who were strategically 
responsible for the atrocities were not put on trial. Under pressure from the 
international community, the government of Indonesia established the Ad Hoc 
Human Rights Court for East Timor in Jakarta, through which 18 members of 
the Indonesian Armed Force were indicted, all of whom were subsequently found 
not guilty (Cohen 2002).
On this point, the government of Timor-Leste prioritized its national 
security, which was defined by strategic interests for survival, over the welfare 
of victims of Indonesian occupation. As a result, the Indonesia-Timor-Leste 
Commission of Truth and Friendship was established in August 2005 to serve 
as a political mechanism to support national security priorities of Timor-Leste 
(Strating 2014). This diplomatic maneuver contributed to generating a conducive 
environment for SSR, as the government of Timor-Leste was able to keep the size 
of the military to a minimum, as well as to station its contingent away from both 
the western frontier with Indonesia and the political center. Moreover, those who 
lived in border districts no longer had to be troubled by the shadow of ninjas or 
an illusion of infiltration by the Indonesian forces and former pro-integration 
militias into their communities. This phantom did in fact reemerge later in 2009-
10, to plague the traumatized population in the border areas when the domestic 
security situation had deteriorated due to the political turmoil in the capital (CIGI 
2010; Myrttinen 2013). 
To address the second challenge, regarding the existing division between 
former pro-independent residents and former pro-integration residents, the UN, 
together with the newly established government, launched a community-based 
reconciliation initiative called the CAVR, which focused on repairing broken 
relationships between the community and those who had committed atrocities 
under Indonesian rule.
In a CAVR’s mediation session in Baboe leten village in Atsabe, a sub-
district of Ermera, which took place on November 13, 2003, the public hearing 
process maintained the characteristic of a formal mediation, while at the same 
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time such a rational-legal format was accompanied by the indigenous perspective 
of a ceremonial ritual. The mediation session was held in an open public space 
where people were allowed to attend the hearing. In a customary Nahe Biti, it 
was the role of traditional elders and rational-legal authority to mediate the case. 
In the hybrid Nahe Biti Boot, formally known as the Community Reconciliation 
Process (CRP) adopted in the CAVR, it was a team of impartial mediators, not 
the traditional authority, that facilitated the dialogue (Kent 2012). Minor offences 
were dealt with by the CRP and forgiveness was granted to perpetrators in return 
for sharing truth, i.e., explaining to victims and/or their family members exactly 
what happened so that they could properly mourn the dead (Grenfell 2021) (this 
point is discussed in the context of ancestral spirits in the article by Winch in this 
special issue).
The CAVR remained fundamentally a feature of an externally-led top-
down approach, since it was introduced jointly by the UN and the government 
of Timor-Leste. Although decorated with a façade of indigenous ceremony, 
involving traditional leaders, the CAVR was not a truly community-driven 
mechanism. It was a hybrid form of dispute settlement, in which a customary 
mechanism was integrated with a modern form of mediation. For victims, 
reconciliation was an established national policy set by the leadership, and these 
victims felt that they were compelled to forgive the perpetrators. Due to the lack 
of social safety nets, victims had to find their own ways to survive, while the 
perpetrators of minor offenses were welcomed back in their community without 
facing retaliation nor reparation. Even those who committed serious crimes such 
as murder and rape were released from jail after they had served their terms, 
which usually ran for three to four years (UN 2005). 
The government of Timor-Leste did not have sufficient funding to provide 
financial support to the victims before the Petroleum Fund was established 
in 2005. In the beginning, therefore, no financial reparations were given to 
the victims for the damage incurred by atrocities committed between 1975-
99. Material support from the government only came after the 2006 crisis. The 
government introduced the reparation scheme called bolsa da mae (which literally 
means the wallet of mother) that provided US$80 per year to a female-headed 
household, and a generous pension scheme for veterans (annual benefits ranged 
from US$2,760 to US$9,000 in 2011) (Dale et al. 2014). These reparation schemes 
provided financial help to the most vulnerable groups in Timorese society. 
Nevertheless, as exemplified in the amounts given to the veterans’ pensions, the 
priority of the government was placed on salvaging or appeasing the veterans, 
who formed various non-statutory forces, since arguably, they still had the skills 
and means to potentially disturb the political landscape of the country. The needs 
of the most vulnerable groups such as widows, orphans and victims of sexual 
assaults were often neglected by the government. The task of caring for these 
victim groups was assumed by non-state actors. The Catholic Church and NGOs 
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provided both healing and material support, whereas traditional authorities and a 
customary dispute resolution mechanism at the sub-national level helped victims 
to come to terms with past tragedies by offering indigenous sanctions and healing 
of broken relationships, which helped to soften any revenge-seeking behavior 
and calmed the attitudes of such victims (for a supplementary role played by civil 
society, see the article written by Tanaka-Sakabe in this special issue).
In the literature, these transitional justice initiatives are usually not regarded 
as typical SSR activities. Nevertheless, the overarching and profound effects that 
these undertakings had on the SSR process cannot be neglected if one wishes 
to appreciate the overall impact of SSR on peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. These 
transitional justice measures set the premises for subsequent SSR policies and 
activities implemented in Timor-Leste, which is the topic of the next section.
A Mid-term Evaluation of SSR in Timor-Leste
In Timor-Leste, where a new state was being constructed under UN auspices, the 
institutions of a new military, police, civil defense institutions and four district 
courts and a court of appeals were established. In a nutshell, the UN was tasked 
with building institutions that would contribute to political stability. However, 
these same statutory institutions that the UN helped to develop also subsequently 
and contradictorily turned into major sources of political instability and tools 
for political maneuvers. In hindsight, this created a serious predicament in 
the security and justice sectors, and thus the UN efforts to develop an effective 
security sector in Timor-Leste have been often regarded as a failure. Nevertheless, 
in the aftermath of such a critical setback, the government of Timor-Leste, 
sometimes independently, and sometimes together with her bilateral partners, 
has actively tackled this impediment to SSR, identified as the third challenge to 
SSR in the previous section.
It is beyond the scope of this article to offer a comprehensive assessment of 
the complex SSR processes and various outcomes. The following account is an 
attempt to evaluate the mid-term impact of reform efforts undertaken by the UN 
and the government of Timor-Leste to address the three critical SSR challenges—
the divisions between the military and the police, within the military, and 
between the police and the communities they serve—, employing an analytical 
lens that focuses on the triad hybrid nexuses.
Evaluation of the Exogenous/Endogenous Nexus
A seed for the division between the military and the police was rooted in the 
genesis of the two organizations, in that not all the FALINTL combatants 
were recruited into the military, whereas some former Indonesian National 
Police officers were recruited into the police. The decision regarding as to who 
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could join the military and who could be demobilized was made in a less than 
transparent manner; it was left in the hands of senior FALINTIL officers who 
were not affiliated with the leading political party, the Revolutionary Front of 
Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), but were loyal to Xanana Gusmão, who 
was the former commander-in-chief of the FALINTIL (Elias 2006). Although the 
FAILNTIL emerged originally as the military wing of the FRETILIN, during the 
resistance/liberation struggle, Gusmão split from the FRETILIN. 
This gap widened as a result of the political rivalry which operated under 
the “politics of survival” between the FRETILIN and Gusmão. As senior military 
positions were filled with Gusmão loyalists, the FRETILIN government perceived 
it as a threat to its survival, and as a countermeasure, it started to invest in the 
police. This led to both the politicization of the military (Saramago 2011) and 
militarization of the police (CIGI 2010).
This politically induced division was exacerbated by the UN’s SSR policy 
that concentrated its support on developing the capacity of the police, while the 
reform of the military was regarded as secondary and left to bilateral donors. 
Although the UN placed its emphasis on creating a professional and accountable 
police service, the FRETILIN government utilized the exogenous support to 
transform the police into a counterweight against the military, as seen in the 
creation of special units such as the Police Reserve Unit (URP), the Border Patrol 
Unit (UPF) and the Rapid Intervention Units (UIRs) within the structure of the 
police. The URP was set up as a counter-insurgency unit dealing with militia 
incursions from Indonesian West Timor (CICG 2010). The UPF is responsible 
for providing security, patrol, and management of the border areas facing the 
Indonesian Armed Force, whereas the UIRs are tasked with responding to civil 
disorder in urban areas (Human Rights Watch 2006). Due to the nature of these 
special units, they are heavily armed (CIGI 2010). 
Carrying over the colonial legacy of Portuguese rule and 24 years of 
Indonesian dictatorship, the people of Timor-Leste have never experienced rule 
of law based nor accountable policing (Kocak 2018). Against this backdrop, the 
police modeled itself on the Portuguese police forces: one with a civilian character 
and the other as a more paramilitary-like gendarmerie force. These special units 
adopted the gendarmerie style of policing and were widely perceived to be a sign 
of the militarization of the police (Belo 2014). 
By 2009, the police had grown to a strength of 3,168, with the URP having 
80, the UPF having 240, and the two UIRs combined having 190 officers (CIGI 
2009; Belo 2014). On the other hand, the military, with a maximum strength of 
only 1,500, were mostly located in the far eastern district away from the capital 
and equipped with automatic rifles. During the 2006 crisis, as anticipated, the 
FRETILIN government mobilized the URP as a countermeasure against the 
military (CIGI 2010).
As a result of the 2006 crisis, a change of government was realized in 2008, 
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and the new government invoked a series of localized reform activities of the two 
statutory forces, often accompanied by socio-economic measures. These post-
crisis government initiatives successfully removed serious divisions within the 
military and between the military and the police. 
First, in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis, all the “petitioners” (about a half 
of the military and mostly not affiliated with the FALINTIL, recruited under the 
UNTAET) were dismissed, which effectively eliminated the source of the internal 
division within the military. To fill the vacant positions in the military, the new 
government recruited 600 new personnel (92 officers, 157 sergeants, and 351 
privates) (Government of Timor-Leste 2011). With this one move, one of the 
key initial SSR efforts led by the UN was effectively canceled, but the problem of 
the internal division was addressed effectively and the military became a more 
coherent and resilient organization. The entire force was brought under the 
formal control of Gusmão who became the Prime Minister in the 2007 election. 
His government did not forget to extend its support to those dismissed from 
the military, offering them monetary compensation of US$8000 (three years of 
back payment plus US$1500) (Kingsbury 2009; ICG 2013). This is seen to be 
part of the practice of “buying peace,” as potential spoilers are given alternative 
means of livelihood in exchange for “burying the hatchet” (ICG 2013). Such 
socio-economic measures included: (1) a retirement payout for the “petitioners,” 
along with two headline benefit programs for helping the displaced in Dili and 
recognizing veterans of the independence struggle; (2) introducing social-
protection schemes and expanding the civil service; and (3) concluding major 
infrastructure contracts with potential spoilers (ibid.). The “buying peace” 
policy has brought a quick fix for serious problems, a much needed form of 
psychological closure to the daunting era of violence for a society devasted 
by conflict, and the chance to make a fresh restart for a brighter future. At the 
same time, this expedient solution was employed not only to appease frustrated 
spoilers but also to consolidate the power bases of political elites in the power 
center. While this can be viewed positively as a sign of local ownership, which 
crafted a local version of dealing with community security challenges, it can also 
be interpreted as a symptom of illiberal roll-back (Uesugi 2018).
Secondly, the new government sought to achieve reconciliation between the 
two security institutions which fought each other in 2006. Despite criticism from 
the UN, by merging the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, the 
military and the police were put under the single leadership of Gusmão who was 
serving as both the Prime Minister and Minister for Defense and Security. This 
local initiative violated the organic laws of the military and the police enacted as 
a part of the externally-led SSR, which stipulated and stressed their functional 
separation. In addition, by establishing military/police as “combined commands” 
and organizing joint exercises and operations, the wedges which existed between 
these institutions seem to have been removed. Circumstantial evidence indicates 
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that this makeshift arrangement was terminated after the situation had stabilized, 
and the military has been placed back under the Ministry of Defense and the 
police under the Ministry of Interior. No serious institutional battle between the 
two statutory forces has been witnessed. It seems that both institutions are more 
resilient now to political intervention and more professionalized than before, as 
they have remained politically neutral in all of the past elections carried out in 
2007, 2012, 2017 and 2018, and kept their allegiance to the democratically elected 
government, regardless of the party or parties which emerged victorious in each 
election.
The above account reveals that the UN’s efforts in SSR were focused primarily 
on the national level security architecture. Although the presence of frustrated 
non-statutory forces not only posed a threat to national security but also caused 
anxiety in rural communities (Sugito et al. 2020), a mismatch between the 
exogenous and endogenous priorities prevented the UN-led SSR from addressing 
the issues of non-statutory actors. At the same time, however, through advocating 
various efforts aimed at addressing the issue of non-statutory actors such as 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), community policing 
and the above-mentioned transitional justice initiatives, the UN sought to 
help the government to bridge at least part of this gap between the formal and 
informal, which is the subject of the following section.
Evaluation of the Formal/Informal Nexus
Governance and violent conflict are intimately related. Most occurrences of the 
latter are caused and sparked by failures in the former, while there is also a reverse 
causality at work, with conflicts pulling down governance and public institutions 
and structures. In Timor-Leste, unjust social and economic settlements and 
distribution of spoils caused discontent which then spilled over into the security 
realm, which, in turn, contributed to the eruption of a politico-security crisis 
in 2006. Veterans are informal security actors who took part in the resistance 
movement in 1975-1999. The veterans who either refused to join, or who were 
rejected from statutory institutions expressed their concerns and frustration, 
which turned into a major source of insecurity, as they became increasingly 
recruited by disgruntled veterans’ groups (Leach 2017a). Addressing the 
legitimate claims of the veterans was considered to be an urgent priority by the 
local political elites, but this sense of urgency was not shared by the UN, which 
was preoccupied with the reform of the formal institutions. 
The most salient SSR-related activity targeted at the non-statutory forces 
was DDR, through which reintegration of ex-combatants to civilian life was 
promoted. DDR was closely linked with the national level SSR activity of 
establishing the military and its recruitment process. Through DDR, a formal/
informal nexus was created, which later surfaced as major evidence of existing 
cleavages not only in the security sector but also in all aspects of Timorese society. 
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During the transitional period between 1999 and 2002 (before the independence 
and enaction of the Constitution), the military was established in response to 
pressures from increasingly frustrated FALINTIL fighters who remained at 
voluntary cantonment in the Aileu district. The UN decided that only 650 of 
the former FALINTIL combatants were to be absorbed into the military, leaving 
more than 1,300 of them effectively being excluded (Rees 2004; CIGI 2010). For 
those who were not selected, two externally-led DDR initiatives were carried 
out. First, as early as 1999, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
initiated the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP), through which 
1,308 ex-combatants received an immediate cash payment to rehabilitate and 
facilitate their reintegration into civilian life (de Almeida 2017). Later, in 2002, the 
UNDP with support from the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
(UNMISET) implemented the Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme 
for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste (RESPECT). While the 
FRAP’s main beneficiaries were former FALINTIL soldiers, the RESPECT’s scope 
of the beneficiaries was expanded and included not only ex-combatants but also 
vulnerable groups such as widows, orphans, and disaffected youth (ibid.).
FALINTIL veterans who were not included in the military were expected 
to be demobilized and reintegrated through either the FRAP and the RESPECT 
processes. Nevertheless, even after their formal DDR processes were completed, 
certain influential commanders such as Cornelio Gama, who was one of the com-
manders of the FALINTIL, continued to maintain their patron-client networks 
and formed non-statutory forces (Scambary 2019). As the veterans had identified 
themselves not as victims of war, but as heroes who fought to address social 
injustice, they were easily frustrated by the lack of improvement in the social 
situation (World Bank 2008). The issue of the veterans was exacerbated by the UN 
decision regarding the establishment of the police force. The UN recruited over 
350 Timorese who were former officers of the Indonesian National Police (ICG 
2008). In contrast, how to manage the discontent and the sense of marginalization 
shared amongst the veterans and their family members has been recognized by 
the government as the most urgent priority in post-independence Timor-Leste. 
The veterans issue was framed as a matter of social justice (World Bank 2008). 
Their services to the nation needed to be acknowledged and appreciated.
The first government led by Marí Alkatiri, however, was merely able to 
offer ceremonial acknowledgement and nominal appreciation to the veterans, as 
the state budget from independence in 2002, until the Petroleum Fund started 
in 2005, was solely dependent on foreign aid (on this point, see the articles by 
Daimon-Sato and by Simangan and Bose in this special issue). Substantial and 
monetary based compensatory measures for the veterans had to wait until the 
second government led by Xanana Gusmão, who allocated US$23.1 million 
(3% of the state budget) in 2010, $72 million (6% of the state budget) in 2011, 
and US$109.7 million (9% of the state budget) in 2012 towards veterans’ affairs 
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(Kent and Kinsella 2015). The Statute of the National Liberation Combatants 
(Law 3/2006) was established on April 12, 2006, when the military’s disciplinary 
troubles, in which approximately one third of the troops deserted their barracks, 
merged into what became known as the 2006 crisis. Although there was no direct 
linkage between the passage of the veterans’ statute and the 2006 crisis, a series of 
government initiatives were implemented to address the issues related to veterans 
during this period. The Decree-Law 15/2008 entitled Pensions of the Combatants 
and Martyrs of the National Liberation is a case in point.
In addition to veterans, other non-statutory actors called the Martial Arts 
Groups (MAGs) existed in Timor-Leste. From the point of view of ordinary 
people, MAGs were seen as a major source of insecurity at the community level 
(Scambary 2019). MAGs have their origin in the clandestine movements, militias, 
or vigilante groups prevalent during Indonesian rule. Three major MAGs—PSHT, 
KORK and Kera Sakti—were considered to be serious threats to the community 
as they had ties with local power-brokers who would mobilize them at will to 
cause trouble. They emerged as a concern to ordinary people and became a 
potential risk to national stability (World Bank 2008). 
Nevertheless, neither the UN nor the government of Timor-Leste could cope 
with the problems posed by MAGs for a number of reasons. For one, MAGs are 
widely accepted throughout the country and are even popular among certain 
elements in society because many of them are based on the indigenous linage and 
kinship relationships that are prevailing factors in all aspects of life in Timorese 
society. Furthermore, many leaders of the MAGs maintained close ties with 
political elites and senior leadership in the statutory forces (Myrttinen 2007), 
which made it difficult for both the UN and the government to address the MAG 
issues. After experiencing a series of internal security challenges, the above-
mentioned three major MAGs were banned by the government in 2013.
With the introduction of the legal ban, together with the generational 
turnover in some of the major MAGs, the main source of community insecurity 
has transformed from MAGs to the anti-social activities of youth (Belun 2014). 
The main provocateurs in communal violence are males between 15 and 25 
years old, and senior members of the MAGs are now assuming responsibility for 
cracking down on petty crimes committed by their junior members (Personal 
Interview with Serafim do Rego Mashedo, the Village Chief of Bebonuk, in Dili, 
Timor-Leste on May 1, 2019). As the focus of community security shifted from 
MAGs to youth, the government lifted the ban on the three major MAGs in 
February 2019, and they were allowed to resume their activities as long as they 
registered with both the Martial Arts Regulatory Commission and the Ministry 
of Justice (Government of Timor-Leste 2020). The introduction of the CPC, a 
new hybrid community security mechanism, combined with a new community 
policing policy under which one police officer is assigned to every village, have so 
far proven effective in dealing with the problems of youth at the community level. 
128 Yuji Uesugi
Even though many of the frustrated youth are jobless, and community policing is 
not the right remedy for addressing employment issues, it has served as a means 
to bridge the gap that existed between the national level SSR policy and security 
challenges prevalent at the grassroots community level, which is the focus of the 
next section.
Evaluation of the National/Subnational Nexus
There were two waves that were intended to introduce community policing 
in Timor-Leste as a tool to bridge the national/subnational gap. The first one 
came during the initial five years of state-building under UN auspices (1999-
2005). Although community policing practice was introduced by the UN, the 
local situation prevented the police from mainstreaming community policing 
in its strategy and practice (CIGI 2010). Of the 3,386 police officers, only three 
were allocated to each Community Police Unit in 13 districts, except for the Dili 
district, which had nine (UN 2012; Belo 2014).
The second wave of community policing came into being after Timorese 
society had undergone the 2006 crisis and after the assassination attempts on 
the president and the prime minister by rebels in 2008. Since 2009, the Asia 
Foundation has worked with the police to develop a Timorese model of com-
munity policing, and since 2016, has implemented the Community Policing 
Support Program with the New Zealand Police (Perry et al. 2019). Municipality 
Security Councils were established at the municipality level, in which the 
municipality president (former district administrator, equivalent to governor), 
the municipality police commander, and community leaders meet, discuss and 
coordinate together to ensure prevention of crime and conflict at the municipality 
level, in ways which affects the daily life and security of ordinary people.
The development of the largely positive perception of statutory forces by 
ordinary Timorese can be accounted for by the effective use of community 
policing. The relationship between the police and the community has improved, 
which has contributed to a sense of security in the community, and vice versa. 
One possible reason for this positive development in community-police relations 
can be found in the adoption of community policing as a national strategy by the 
police in the second wave (Government of Timor-Leste 2009). An environment 
conducive to such change emerged as a result of the political reconciliation 
between the two political leaders—Gusmão and Alkatiri—and also through 
addressing the concerns of veterans via the policy of buying peace. Before 
political reconciliation was achieved, the police were seen by the political elite 
as a tool for political maneuvers, and thus, the creation of a militarized police 
was envisioned by some political actors. After achieving political reconciliation, 
however, the government shifted its emphasis from establishing a powerful 
and militarized police force to creating a more public-friendly force ready to 
serve their community. This choice was made by the government with support 
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from bilateral donors such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand (Dewhurst 
and Greising 2017). While this shift did not materialize before the departure 
of the UNMIT in 2012, support for community-led policing started as early as 
2009 (Personal Interview with Boavida Ribeiro, the PNTL Community Policing 
Commander, the PNTL Headquarters in Dili, May 6, 2019).
As pointed out at the beginning of this article, there has been a significant 
increase in the perception of community level engagement by the police, and 
an overwhelming majority of Timorese people now trust the police. At present, 
safety and security are no longer major concerns for ordinary people, especially 
in rural communities. According to TATOLI: People Perception Survey July-
August 2018 (Monteiro 2019), only 0.2% of the population answered that 
“provision of safety/security” should be the government’s chief priority, and only 
0.1% responded that the government should spend the majority of their money 
on the “provision of safety/security.” When these respondents were allowed to 
give multiple answers as to the government’s priority areas, “safety and security” 
received 26.8%, while “roads and bridges in poor condition” received 61.3% and 
“access to water and sanitation” received 51% responses, respectively. When asked 
what the single biggest problem was facing Timor-Leste at the national level, 
only 2% selected “safety and security” and 0.8% chose “access to justice.” These 
results are one of the indications that, in Timor-Leste, perceptions of national and 
community security are largely positive and widely shared among the population. 
A newly introduced dialogue platform called the CPC has played an 
instrumental role in improving the relationship between the police and the 
community, although in the above-mentioned survey no one identified the CPC 
as the most important government program that benefits all the people today 
(ibid.). The CPC is a hybrid forum and mechanism through which the police 
and the community they serve can come together to discuss, prevent, and resolve 
problems that arise within a given village. Under this scheme, one Suco Police 
Officer (OPS) is supposed to be deployed to every village, and all 452 villages in 
Timor-Leste have already received their OPS (Personal Interview with Boavida 
Ribeiro, the PNTL Community Policing Commander, the PNTL Headquarters 
in Dili, May 6, 2019). The CPC is headed by the village chief and its membership 
consists of village-level agents, the Suco Council including traditional leaders 
and other community leaders, together with a state agent, in the deployment 
of the OPS, who acts as the deputy. However, there are many shortcomings to 
the OPS. For example, Kocak (2018) makes the valid criticism that the OPS are 
both understaffed and ill-equipped. Not all the villages have a police station 
for their OPS, and even when they have a police station, their OPS are not 
necessarily stationed there all the time. Nonetheless, the OPS embedded in the 
CPC, advocates a basic philosophy of Timorese community policing called the 
Visibility, Involvement and Professionalism (VIP) approach and this allows the 
police to be more visible in the community and delegates to the community 
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members a shared responsibility for providing security for themselves (Personal 
Interview with Boavida Ribeiro, the PNTL Community Policing Commander, the 
PNTL Headquarters in Dili, May 6, 2019).
As of April 2019, CPCs were established in 246 out of 452 villages (ibid.). 
Because every CPCs are established on the Suco Councils which used to serve 
the dual functions of community dispute resolution and customary justice, they 
also offer a mediation service if requested by the parties concerned (Dewhurst 
and Greising 2017). This new scheme is in line with the traditions of Timorese 
society, as problems that arise in the community are solved, by rational-legal 
and/or traditional authorities, depending on the nature of the problem, through 
a customary process. The CPC, which includes the OPS as a representative of 
the state, is a “hybrid” mechanism and works as a quasi-formalized customary 
alternative dispute resolution process in conjunction with the formal judicial 
processes. According to the Asia Foundation report (Wassel and Rajalingam 
2015), about 76% of reported crimes have been referred to the CPC, of which 
67% were resolved through mediation by community leaders and 20% were 
settled through traditional means. This indicates that most of the problems 
would be dealt with in a quasi-formal manner. This hybrid or makeshift approach 
was adopted to fill the capacity deficit of the police as well as that of other 
formal judicial and legal means by formally delegating the responsibility to the 
community level authorities who have traditionally carried out such functions 
(for a detailed discussion on traditional justice and governance, see the article by 
Miyazawa and Miyazawa in this special issue).  
An observer reported that “The lack of access to justice, compounded by the 
lack of adequate police response and investigative capacity, is a main contributing 
factor to the widespread reliance of communities on traditional or informal 
justice mechanisms” (CIGI 2011, 4). While the capacity of the police remains 
poor, it seems that the lack of access to formal justice is not the main reason for 
the prevalent use of customary justice mechanisms. Through several platforms 
of dialogue at multiple levels of Timorese society, local actors have been able 
to define and refine their needs and priorities, and have come up with effective 
means to prevent and address local challenges in their own ways; the manner of 
which cannot be easily identified with, nor defined by, the fixed lens emanating 
from Western liberal values and practices.
Conclusion
The initial mistakes by the UN in SSR caused serious damage to the wellbeing of 
the people of Timor-Leste, as evidenced by the way in which such defects within 
the security sector gave rise to the 2006 crisis and subsequent political instability. 
In particular, with regard to non-statutory actors, the UN’s approach was 
 Evaluating Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste 131
limited to short-term DDR projects, and it thus underestimated the long-term 
implications of veterans’ issues in security governance. As a result, the UN was 
criticized for a lack of credibility and was gradually marginalized by its Timorese 
counterparts (Ferro 2011). Since the second electoral victory in 2012, the 
government led by Gusmão had begun to actively circumvent the UNMIT, as its 
presence was increasingly seen as irrelevant to maintaining both political stability 
and physical safety in Timor-Leste. Overall, security tasks were undertaken 
by an Australian-led International Stabilization Force and Portugal’s National 
Republican Guard, and not by UNMIT. Although the UN suspended the policing 
responsibility of the government and authorized UNMIT to undertake interim 
executive policing, UNMIT was ineffective in resolving the problems posed by 
the rebel group that was alleged to have attacked and attempted to assassinate the 
president and the prime minister in February 2008.
Nevertheless, the above analysis of the trajectory of SSR indicates that the 
UN peace operations in Timor-Leste were able to navigate and support the 
Timorese leadership to lead a top-down SSR approach, in particular bringing a 
certain level of political stability and physical safety at the national level (Lemay-
Hébert 2009). It seems that by 2012, the UN, together with key bilateral donors 
such as Australia and Portugal, as well as their Timorese counterparts, had at 
least overcome the majority of the shortcomings of the earlier UN intervention. 
After barely avoiding killing each other in the 2006 crisis, the “Generation of 
’75,” who were prominent in the resistance movement against Indonesia and who 
still dominate the political leadership in Timor-Leste, such as Xanana Gusmão, 
Marí Alkatiri, José Ramos-Horta, and Francisco “Lu-Olo” Guterres, have agreed 
to change the rules of the game from “winner-takes-all” to “power-sharing” or 
“consensus democracy” as a transitional measure towards “Quality Peace” (Leach 
2017b; Hasegawa 2013). The “politics of survival” has now become the “politics of 
democratic competition” (Howe, Peou, and Uesugi 2021). As a result of this new 
emerging political space, the UN intervention was able to lay the foundation for 
further development of the security and justice sectors in Timor-Leste, despite 
the various setbacks and the lack of immediate positive feedback. Since Timor-
Leste’s political scene has not experienced a major generational turnover, it is 
uncertain whether the existing rule will be renewed when the Generation of ’75, 
who are largely all in their seventies, leave the political arena. Their departure 
may well unleash new power struggles among younger generations of Timorese 
elites.
In addition to the main targets of SSR, that is, both the security and justice 
sectors, the above analysis sheds some light on the nexus between these sectors 
and the political and socio-economic dimensions of peacebuilding in crafting a 
conducive environment for promoting and implementing SSR. It also underlines 
the continued efforts made by the government of Timor-Leste to follow through 
and adjust externally-led SSR to meet evolving needs on the ground. The above 
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case study of Timor-Leste indicates that, although the institutions and structures 
introduced by the UN were fine-tuned or rearranged by the government, some of 
the core foundational security governance frameworks remain effective, and are 
now integrated into indigenous customs and practices, thus creating a hybridized 
model of SSR. 
In the case of Timor-Leste, one of the most undervalued efforts of security 
governance revolved around the socio-economic measures for veterans. The 
UN failed to address the feeling of victimhood shared among the marginalized 
sectors of the Timorese population. These sentiments of victimhood surfaced 
after various transitional justice measures were introduced, as they were geared 
largely towards criminal justice, as in punishing the perpetrators of serious crime, 
and not geared towards social justice, specifically supporting the livelihoods of 
victims who were mostly veterans and their family members (Howe, Peou, and 
Uesugi 2021). While the UN framed the issue of veterans from the perspective of 
short-term DDR, the government followed it up with much longer commitments 
in terms of socio-economic measures, which had a profound impact on security 
affairs both at the national and community levels. The community policing 
practice of juxtaposing the CPC and the OPS seems to have bridged the gap 
which stemmed from the lack of national level capacity in the statutory security 
and justice apparatus and the ground level reality, by legitimizing and supporting 
the existing local capacity. 
The initial malfunctions of a newborn state, including the radical recon-
figuration of the power-balance within the elites and the lack of mastery in new 
approaches to security governance on the part of indigenous actors caused early 
setbacks. These setbacks were exaggerated by the lack of contextual knowledge 
and insensitivity to the political dynamics on the part of external actors. 
Nonetheless, Timorese society has found a way, after a process of trial and error, 
to achieve political stability and physical safety within Timorese society, which 
always was and remains the overarching goal of SSR.
At the same time, the environment constantly changes, and the security 
and justice sectors need to respond to major circumstantial changes expected 
in near future. Two critical junctures will soon collide, when the Generation 
of ’75, in particular Gusmão, will retire from the political landscape, and also 
when the oil and gas reserves in the Timor Gap run out. While these changes in 
external conditions are not a typical focus of the existing theory/model of SSR, 
the mid-term elevation of SSR in Timor-Leste suggests that it is the effect of these 
contextual factors that has to be taken into consideration if one is to conceive 
an adaptive and everlasting SSR strategy that can make externally-led SSR 
sustainable and achieve the quality of peace. This article has sought to emphasize 
the need to shed light on these indirect factors surrounding SSR.
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Epilogue
Let us go back to the initial inquiry. How and why were the police able to win 
the trust of community leaders as well as the general public in the matter of a 
mere few years following the departure of the UN mission in 2012? The above 
analysis has, it is hoped, demonstrated that the primary factor was not the 
enhanced capacity of the statutory institutions. Rather, circumstantial evidence 
indicates that it was in fact due to the improvement in the security situation itself. 
Why then, has the security situation improved even though the capacity of the 
statutory institutions remains at a low level. There are two possible explanations 
for this. First and foremost, political reconciliation between the two most senior 
political figures in Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão and Marí Alkatiri, was achieved 
after they have barely escaped the collapse of the newborn state in the 2006 
crisis. The second reason is that by employing the policy of “buying peace,” the 
government was able to address the key socio-economic injustices shared by 
the influential veterans. These factors interacted in ways which gradually saw an 
improvement in the security situation. 
In terms of the politico-security field, the military/police joint operations 
successfully removed a source of insecurity in 2008. Through this process, a 
consensus emerged among the Generation of ’75 that the notion of the politics of 
survival had to be terminated. The second factor was found in the socio-economic 
field. After the transfer of wealth from the Petroleum Fund began in 2005, the 
state budget was able to be doubled in 2008, which allowed the government the 
freedom to allocate financial resources to its “buying peace” endeavors, with 
pensions for veterans being one such initiative. While these factors do not seem 
to be related to the series of SSR activities undertaken in Timor-Leste, it was in 
fact such contextual factors as these which have promoted SSR and vice versa.
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